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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is Respondent Critical Access Group, Inc's ("CAG") response brief. It responds to 
Appellant's Brie/filed by Appellant ABC Agra, LLC ("ABC"). 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The question in this case is whether the district court should be compelled to decide, and 
to ael:enIJ, a is not ABC CAG, a Minnesota non-profit 
corporation, J'-''-'n.Hi a Qr<l.T1nn regarding the enforceability a real property use restriction 
despite the fact that there are no existing or proposed uses that implicate the restriction. The 
district court (Judge Elgee presiding) correctly determined that ABC's claim against CAG was 
not ripe and granted CAG's motion to dismiss. The district court awarded CAG costs and 
attorney fees in the total amount of$11.058.00. ABC appealed. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On May 11,2012, ABC sued CAG seeking a judgment from the district court "declaring 
that the Subject Property may only be used for the construction of 'healthcare facilities' defined 
as being a facility constructed for the 'private practice of medicine for the care and treatment of 
human beings. '" R., p. 7. The potential use restriction that is the basis for ABC's claim is 
contained in an Option Agreement executed by ABC and CAG's predecessor in interest. R., pp. 
4-5, 18-24. 
Upon being served with the Complaint, CAG immediately filed a motion to dismiss 
under LR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the case was not ripe because there was no 
present need for court action. R., p. 61. In support ofthat motion, CAG pointed out that the 
Complaint lacked any allegation that CAG breached any part ofthe Option Agreement, that 
CAG has commenced any construction on the property, or that CAG has taken any action at all 




Following briefing and oral argument, on September 7,2012, the district court entered its 
Memorandum Decision on Motion to Dismiss ("Memorandum Decision"), in which it concluded 
that ABC's claim was not ripe and granted CAG's Motion to Dismiss. R., p. 109. The district 
court, Judge Elgee presiding, stated: 
Unquestionably, this case involves uncertain or contingent 
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not 
occur at alL Whether any controversy ever arises turns to a large 
degree, not entirely, on what sort of a facility is proposed for 
development. As pointed out by CAG, there is no current threat, 
<U"J""" or allegation that the property not be developed in 
accordance with the specified definition of a healthcare facility, 
and thus it is as likely as not that a possible defense to the terms of 
the Option Agreement may never have to be raised or litigated. 
R., p. 104 (emphasis in original). 
The court entered judgment against ABC on October 3,2012 (R., pp. 111-12). The court 
awarded costs and attorney fees to CAG as the prevailing party and then entered an Amended 
Judgment on January 18,2013 against ABC in the total amount of$11,058.00 (Supp. R., pp. 23-
24). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The only facts in the record are those alleged in ABC's Complaint. CAG accepted all of 
the facts set forth in the Complaint as true solely for purposes of its Motion to Dismiss and 
continues to do so for this appeal. 
The Complaint contains the following description of the real estate transaction that is the 
subject of this case. 
• ABC granted an option in favor of St. Benedicts (CAG's predecessor in 
interest) to purchase Lot 6 in ABC's "Crossroads Point Business Center 
PUD." Complaint, ~ 6; R., p. 4. 
• St. Benedicts, prior to the Option Agreement, represented (according to 
the Complaint) that it would build a new hospital on the property. 




., The purchase price for Lot 6 was $1,678,000. Complaint, Exh. D, ~ l(c); 
R.,19 . 
., ABC agreed to gift two lots to St. Benedicts (Lots 7 and 8) if St. Benedicts 
exercised its option to purchase Lot 6. See Complaint, ~ 8; R., p. 4. See 
also Option Agreement (Exh. D to the Complaint), ~~ l(a) and 2; R., pp. 
18 and 20. 
• The Option Agreement stated that the optionee (then S1. Benedicts and 
Saint Alphonsus) covenanted with ABC that they would use the purchased 
lot and the two lots for construction healthcare facilities. 
Conversely, ABC agreed that optionee (St. Benedicts and Saint 
Alphonsus) "shall be the exclusive provider of health care services within 
as Crossroads and agreed to 
restrictions on development of adjacent properties. Option Agreement at 
~~ 4 and 9(i); R., pp. 20 and 22 . 
., Paragraph 7 of the Option Agreement stated that if S1. Benedicts did not 
commence construction of health care facilities on the property within 
three years of the date of the exercise of its option, then ABC had the right 
to buy back all three parcels (the purchased parcel and the two gift 
parcels) for $1,678,000, which is the exact same price that S1. Benedicts 
paid for Lot 6. The buy-back right "shall be in effect for a two (2) year 
period which shall commence at the end of the third year following 
Optionee's exercise of the option on the Real Property." 
• st. Benedicts exercised its option on May 14, 2007 and purchased Lot 6. 
Complaint, ~ 10; R., p. 5. 
• ABC executed a Gift Deed conveying Lots 7 and 8 to S1. Benedicts. 
Complaint, Exh. G; R., pp. 36-39. 
The Complaint is devoid of any allegation that CAG is seeking to use Lots 6, 7 or 8 for 
any purpose other than the construction of health care facilities. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL 
The CAG identifies one issue in addition to those identified in the Appellant's Brief 
Should attorney fees and costs be awarded to CAG on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), paragraph 11 of the 





Idaho law on ripeness is well established with clearly defined standards. The district 
court properly applied those standards in its well reasoned Memorandum Decision. The district 
court focused on the fact that ABC's claim against CAG was based upon hypothetical events that 
never occur and therefore the matter may never need be submitted to the court for 
to it misapplies the np'eness 
addition, ABC inappropriately attempts to use matters allegations 
its Complaint to establish ripeness. Based upon the district court's correct decision that ABC's 
claim against CAG was not ripe, it properly awarded costs and attorney fees to CAG. In 
addition, if CAG prevails before this Court, then it is entitled to recover its costs and attorney 
fees on appeal, and ABC's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal must be denied. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE MATTER WAS NOT RIPE. 
A. Standard of review. 
"This Court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Brooksby v. Geico General Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546, 547,286 P.3d 
182, 183 (2012)(citing Hoffer v. City a/Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 402, 257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). 
This Court must determine whether ABC has alleged sufficient facts in the Complaint, which if 
true, would entitle it to relief. "A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine 
whether a claim for relief has been stated." Young v. City a/Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 
P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
When this Court reviews an order dismissing an action 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard of 
review we apply to a motion for summary judgment. After viewing 
all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving 
party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 





Losser v. Bradstreet 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
B. Standards for determining ripeness: Is there a need for adjudication 
at the present time? 
The only question presented by this appeal is whether, based upon the facts alleged in the 
Complaint, ABC's claim against CAG is "Ripeness asks whether there is need for 
court at 
376,913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996). Said another way: "The traditional ripeness doctrine requires 
a petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a 
real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adjudication." Noh 
v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801,53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). 
This Court recently vacated a declaratory judgment on the ground that the record 
reflected that the case was not ripe. In Paddison Scenic Properties, F amity Trust, L. C. v. Idaho 
County, 153 Idaho 1,278 P.3d 403 (2012), the plaintiff sued the county and the county highway 
district seeking a declaratory judgment that Coolwater Ridge Road in Idaho County was not a 
public road but had instead been dedicated as a right of way as part of a federal project. The 
district court ruled that, regardless of whatever federal rights of way existed, the road was a 
public road because the elements of a cornmon law dedication were met. Id. at 2, 278 P .3d at 
404. On appeal, this Court observed that the road was maintained by the U.S. Forest Service as 
part of the National Forest Road System, and that there was no present dispute between the 
federal government and either the county or highway district concerning the management of the 




alone inconsistently with the United States' present management." !d. As a result, the case was 
not ripe. 
at 
There is no present need for adjudication in this case. The 
parties agree that the public enjoys access over the road because 
the United States owns and maintains it as part of the National 
Forest Road System. Neither the County nor the Highway 
District-the only defendants in this action-has taken an interest 
in managing the road. Nor is there any controversy among or 
between Paddison, the United States, the County, and the Highway 
District regarding the road's management. 
at 406 (emphasis 
In Davidson v. Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 151 P.3d 812 (2006), this Court considered a 
declaratory judgment action brought by the City of Sun Valley concerning the legality of a 
proposed ordinance. The Davidson court, drawing on its own precedent, analyzed the question 
as follows: 
that is 
This Court has described a justiciable controversy as one 
distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical 
or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot ... 
. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching 
the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal 
interests . . .. It must be a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive 
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what 
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 
Weldon [v. Bonner County Tax Coalition], 124 Idaho [31] at 36, 
855 P.2d [868] at 873 (993) (quoting Harris v. Cassia County, 
106 Idaho 513, 516,681 P.2d 988,991 (1984)). Idaho has adopted 
the constitutionally based federal justiciability standard. Noh v. 
Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). Idaho 
courts are authorized under I.C. § 10-1201 to render declaratory 
judgments under certain circumstances, but even actions filed 
pursuant to that statute must present an actual or justiciable 
controversy in order to satisfy federal constitutional justiciability 
requirements. Noh, 137 Idaho at 801, 53 P.3d at 1220. 




The Davidson court held that the case was not ripe because the proposed ordinance had 
not been passed by the voters. "The substance of Davidson's proposed initiative will not be ripe 
for judicial review unless or until passage by the voters brings up the problem of enforcing a 
potentially invalid law. Until then, any judgment on the merits ofthis case would be an 
academic discussion on a hypothetical set of facts. Federal justiciability standards do not permit 
courts to on questions." at 621,151 P.3d at 817 (citations omitted). 
Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act (I.C. 10-1201 et. seq.) does not change this 
analysis. Referencing the inability of Congress to override the federal justiciability standard, this 
Court held that Idaho Code Section 34-1809 (which permits any qualified elector to bring an 
action to determine the constitutionality of an initiative) did not create a justiciable controversy. 
This Court then specifically cited the Declaratory Judgment Act as an example of a statute that 
could confer standing but not justiciability. 
Analogous to the present case, the Idaho Legislature passed 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, but this Court held that "as a 
general rule, a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case 
where an actual or justiciable controversy exists." Harris at 516, 
681 P.2d 988. While I.C. § 34-1809 may be a vehicle to determine 
proper parties to a suit, it cannot create a justiciable controversy. 
Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). 
C. The District Court correctly found that ABC's claim against CAG 
was not ripe because it is based on hypothetical facts. 
The district court cited and quoted from these same authorities in the Memorandum 
Decision. R., pp. 103-04. In particular, the court focused on the portion of the ripeness test that 
requires the record to show a definite and concrete controversy rather than a hypothetical set of 
facts that would result in an advisory opinion. In addition to the Idaho cases discussed above, 
the district court also quoted from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Chandler v. 




R., p. 104. 
'[T]he question of ripeness turns on the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding 
court consideration.' Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm 'n, 461 U.S. 190,201, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 
75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 
L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977)). 'The 
'central concern [of the ripeness inquiry] is whether the case 
involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur 
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at alL" Richardson v. City 
and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. 
Cooper, Richard D. Freer, Joan Steinman, Catherine T. Stmve, 
Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532, at 
112 (2d ed.1984)). 
In Chandler, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision granting the defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that the record showed that plaintiffs lacked standing and the case was 
not ripe because they involved uncertain and speculative future events - specifically, whether 
plaintiffs would be able to recover from third party tortfeasors before turning to the defendant 
insurer for payment. 598 F.3d at 1123. 
Judge Elgee concluded that this was exactly the same type of case because ABC's claim 
is based on "uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed 
may not occur at all." R., p. 109. 
ABC attempts to sidestep the prohibition on advisory opinions based on hypothetical 
facts by claiming that "there is no hypothetical set of facts" in the present case, stating: "Either 
the covenant contained in the Option Agreement is valid or it isn't." Appel/ant's Brief, p. 17. 
This misses the point. The question is not whether the use restriction is valid. The question 
presented here is whether this issue needs to be decided now. The only facts that ABC wants 
this Court to consider are the existence of the Option Agreement and the communications 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1 979823_3.docx. 10797-8 
Page 8 
between the parties. 1 But those facts alone do not create any controversy at all. At most those 
facts show the potential for a dispute to arise in the future. Judge Elgee addressed this as 
follows: 
There are some points to consider. First, in essence, ABC's 
complaint seeks to flush out and resolve any pending or potential 
defenses CAG might have under a "what if' scenario. (What if 
CAG decides to challenge the use restriction contained in the 
Supplemental Declaration?) If parties are able to bring contractual 
claims before the Court any time a proposed or possible defense is 
identified, then contracts are subject to declaratory judgment 
actions at all times. Second, even if such a practice was useful or 
utilized, new and unanticipated factual situations or contract 
dilemmas could always arise, rendering prior determinations 
valueless. Fifth, this is not a contract with an identified 
ambiguity that is causing difficulties between the parties, or which 
will most certainly cause a problem within an identifiable or 
specified period of time. Rather, this case presents an existing 
contract with an identifiable possible contract defense that may 
never be raised, or never have to be raised. 
R., pp. 1 05-06 (emphasis in original). 
As observed by the district court, the only way that the use restriction in the Option 
Agreement would have to be litigated is if the owner of the property (CAG or its successor) 
attempts to build something other than a healthcare facility on the property, which would 
potentially implicate the use restriction in the Option Agreement. There are a multitude of 
hypothetical facts that would result in ABC's proposed declaration being moot. The owner of 
1 For reasons that are not clear, ABC repeatedly claims in its brief that CAG's refusal to give 
unqualified agreement to ABC's legal position on the use restriction is somehow made worse by the fact 
that CAG's attorneys, when they were representing St. Benedicts in the underlying transaction, "authored 
the healthcare language of the restrictive covenant .... " Appellant's Brief, p. 24; see also pp. 1,4-5,9-
10, 11, 13 and 19. However, the input from St. Benedicts' lawyer regarding the definition of health care 
services had to do with the Supplemental Declaration, which does not contain any use restriction 
applicable to any of CAG's property. The only use restriction that potentially applies to CAG's property 
is the one in the Option Agreement, which was drafted and executed several months prior to the 
Supplemental Declaration. Just like the question of validity, whether the definition of "health care 
services" in the Supplemental Declaration applies in any way to the covenant in the Option Agreement is 




the property could build a healthcare facility. ABC could repurchase the property and eliminate 
the use restriction altogether. ABC and the owner of the property could come to an agreement 
that would remove or modify the restriction to permit a different use. A third party could 
purchase ABC's property and its interest under the Option Agreement and subsequently remove 
or modify the restriction. A third party could buy the property owned by both CAG and ABC. 
could go on. district court properly applied Idaho in finding that the hypothetical 
nature of ABC's claim rendered it unripe. 
A. ABC's analysis of the law of ripeness is flawed. 
ABC analyzes Idaho and federal cases in search of support for its position that its claim 
against CAG is ripe. However, the case law relied upon by ABC reinforces the district court's 
decision. 
ABC first discusses Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 
(1989), which ABC calls "one of the seminal cases in Idaho jurisprudence regarding ripeness." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 13. We could not agree more. In Miles, this Court plainly stated that "a 
declaratory judgment action must raise issues that are definite and concrete, and must involve a 
real and substantial controversy as opposed to an advisory opinion based upon hypothetical 
facts." Id. at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. Importantly, the Miles Court concluded that the claim was 
ripe because it was clear from the record that the issue would be brought before the court "either 
now or in the future." No such claim exists in this case. 
The claim in Miles was an attack upon an agreement and implementing legislation that 
limited the Idaho Public Utilities Commission's ability to change rates charged to Idaho Power. 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff s declaratory judgment action on the ground that he had 
not yet been deprived of any constitutionally protected property interest. This Court observed 




do to bring the issue before the court would be to request a rate reduction, which the commission 
would have to deny based on the agreement. Thus, forcing Miles to jump through administrative 
hoops would add nothing to the resolution ofthe legal issues. !d. at 643, 778 P.2d at 765. 
In this case there is no such inevitability in the record. As previously discussed, there are 
many potential outcomes concerning the disposition and use of the Property that would moot 
claim against and make litigating the a waste 
~VUU"Lu..iJln does not include any allegations that support a finding of a present need for a decision 
regarding the use restriction. Simply put, there is no reason to force CAG to litigate when there 
is no "real and substantial" controversy. 
ABC next quotes from Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 913 
P.2d 1141 (1996) and Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006) - two cases that 
this Court determined were ripe for adjudication. But ABC fails to appreciate that in both of 
those cases this Court reiterated that declaratory judgment actions must be based on more than 
hypothetical facts, and that the existing facts in both of those cases showed a need for court 
action at that time. Conversely, the record in this case shows no need for any decision now-
and possibly never. 
Boundary Backpackers involved a challenge to a county ordinance that required state and 
federal agencies to comply with the County's land use plan. Following an adverse verdict, the 
County argued on appeal that the case was not ripe because the County board members testified 
that they did not intend to enforce the ordinance. This Court made short work of that argument. 
The ordinance is in place. It contains several edicts concerning the 
compliance of federal and state agencies with the plan and 
announces that "[ n]o wilderness areas shall be designated in 
Boundary County." The ordinance proclaims: "Boundary County 
shall enforce compliance with [the plan]. ... " The affidavit of the 




"deemed that it would not be proper to seek enforcement of the 
ordinance by fines or penalties" does not override the terms of the 
ordinance requiring enforcement. We will not speculate whether 
the board members will choose another form of enforcement or 
whether a new board will choose to enforce the ordinance by fines 
or penalties. The ordinance requires the plan to be enforced. 
128 Idaho at 376, 913 P.2d at 1146. This stands in stark contrast to the instant case. There was 
nothing hypothetical about the facts the record in Boundary Backpackers - the ordinance was 
it explicitly called for enforcement. there is nothing the record about any 
to creates a for 
regard to the use restriction at this time. 
Similarly, in Schneider, on appeal from an adverse ruling confirming the existence of an 
easement, the defendant claimed that the matter was not ripe because the plaintiff had not filed 
an application with the county to develop the property subject to the alleged easement. 
However, again in contrast to the case at bar, the plaintiff in Schneider alleged that he intended 
to subdivide the property and that the easement afforded the only access. He also alleged 
existing harm based upon the defendant's refusal to allow him to use the easement. 142 Idaho at 
773, 133 P.3d at 1238. Thus, the record in Schneider, including the plaintiffs testimony 
concerning his plans for the property, demonstrated a dispute that needed to be resolved at that 
time. That is simply not true in this case where ABC's claim is based on "uncertain or contingent 
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. II Richardson v. City and 
County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150,1160 (9th Cir.1997). The record is devoid of any evidence 
that the applicability of the use restriction needs to be decided now. There is simply no need at 
this time to require CAG to litigate an issue that may never need to be put before a court. 
ABC also cites to two federal court decisions in support of its position - Schugg v. Gila 
River Indian Community, No. 2-05-AP-003-84 (U.S.D.C., D. AZ, May 25,2012) and Stormans, 
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Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). As with the Idaho cases discussed by ABC, these 
two federal cases actually support the district court's conclusion that ABC's claim was not ripe. 
ABC's own description of the first case plainly reveals how it is distinguishable. "The 
Schugg case involved the plaintiffs' plan to pave certain easements, but they were told by the 
defendant that they did not have a legal right to pave the easements, or to use them for their 
development. 's Brief, p. 22. course that case was ripe. The record 
nr,,:uPrI that the plaintiffs had an existing plan to pave easements, and that the defendant had 
advised them that it would not allow the easements to be paved. It would be ridiculous to require 
the plaintiffs to commence excavating as a prerequisite to hearing the case. There was nothing 
hypothetical about the facts in the record in Schugg that gave rise to the dispute. CAG 
acknowledges that if the record in this case reflected a plan to develop the Property in a manner 
that potentially violated the use restriction then ABC's claim would be ripe. But the record 
before the Court in this case demonstrates no such controversy that needs court action at this 
time. 
The Selecky case provides an even more compelling example. That case involved a 
challenge by certain pharmacies and pharmacists to state rules that required pharmacies to 
dispense legally prescribed medications including the "Plan B" oral contraceptive, regardless of 
personal, moral, or religious objections. 585 F.3d at 1116-17. The issue of ripeness there had to 
do with the claims of two of the individual pharmacists. The defendants argued that the 
pharmacists lacked standing because the state had not taken any enforcement action against 
them. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. The Selecky court determined that the 
pharmacists' claims were ripe because the record reflected that one of them had been forced to 




Plan B. Id. at 1123-24. Again, as with Schugg, the record contained existing facts that 
established the need for court action at that time. 
ABC argues that Schugg and Selecky support its position based upon the fact that ripeness 
in those cases was based on verbal statements rather than something in writing. "If a simple oral 
statement made in [Selecky] can give rise to a determination of ripeness, it is clear that CAG's 
Reply to a 
,",V,,""U"'VH that case is ripe for review." Appellant's Briefat 23. Whether the statement that 
creates a justiciable controversy is spoken or written makes no difference it is the content of 
the statement that determines whether there is a need for court action at that time. In both 
Schugg and Selecky, the statements of the parties established the existence of a "substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality 
to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Selecky, 586 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Md. Cas. 
Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941)). The 
statements in those cases reflected definite plans by the parties to take actions that were at odds 
with each other. In Schugg, the plaintiff planned to pave the easements despite the defendant's 
admonition. In Selecky, the pharmacists planned to refuse to dispense Plan B despite their 
employers' stated intent to terminate them if they did. The controversies in those cases were 
"real" and "immediate." Here, the record does not contain evidence ofa real- as opposed to 
hypothetical- conflict that needs to be resolved right now. 
Interestingly, in Selecky, while the court found the pharmacists' claims against the state 
defendants (that had promulgated the rules) to be ripe, it also found that the pharmacists' claims 
against the agency charged with enforcement of the state law prohibiting discrimination were not 




threatened by that agency. The phannacists alleged that their claims against the agency were 
ripe based upon a letter sent by the agency to the phannacy board stating that a refusal to 
dispense the drugs would be a violation of the anti-discrimination statute. 586 F.3d at 1124-25. 
In other words, in Selecky, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a letter expressing a legal opinion 
contrary to the opinion of the plaintiffs was insufficient to create a justiciable claim. That is 
more than what we have - a letter that of a potential disagreement 
with ABC's opinion. 
The very cases promoted by ABC in support of its appeal ofthe district court's decision 
demonstrate that ABC's claim was not ripe. The courts in those cases focused on whether the 
particular facts in each case established a need for court action at that time, or if the claim was 
based on hypothetical facts. That is the same analysis perfonned by the district court in this 
case, which properly found that ABC's claim was contingent on a particular event that mayor 
may not occur in the future the development of the Property in a manner that would violate the 
use restriction and therefore there was no reason to burden the court and parties to litigate it at 
the present time. 
B. ABC cannot rely on matters outside of the Complaint to establish 
ripeness. 
Before the district court, ABC argued that its claim was ripe based not only on the letter 
from CAG but also because of certain arguments made by CAG in its Reply Memorandum in 
Support a/Motion to Dismiss ["CAG Reply Brief'] and because ABC was hanned by CAG's 
failure to agree with ABC's position on the use restriction. 
In this case, the requisite uncertainty was initially created by the 
letter from CAG's attorney, and has been subsequently bolstered 
by the legal issues raised in CAG's Reply Brief. There is clearly a 
direct and immediate uncertainty that has befallen ABC as a 
consequence, given its inability to make the specific warranties and 




by CAG's predecessor when it acquired its property. 
Plaintiff's Second Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Complaint, p. 5; R., p. 87. 
ABC repeats that argument on appeal. Appellant's Brief, pp. 11, 12, 18, 19,24 and 25. 
However, even if such matters supported a finding of ripeness (which they don't), it is 
inappropriate on a motion brought pursuant to LRC.P. Rule 12(b)(6) to consider any facts 
alleged in the pleadings. 
12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to 
a claim for stated. " Young v. 
City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
In Hellickson v. Jenkins, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed 
judicial notice in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
stating that: 
[t]he only facts which a court may properly consider on a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are those 
appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as 
the court may properly judicially notice. Cohen v. United 
States, 129 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.1942). However, a trial court, 
in considering a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss, has no 
right to hear evidence; and since judicial notice is merely a 
substitute for the conventional method of taking evidence 
to establish facts, the court has no right to take judicial 
notice of anything, with the possible exception of facts of 
common knowledge which controvert averments of the 
complaint. See Grand Opera Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp., 235 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.1956); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. [Metro.] Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67 (9th 
Cir.1956); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title [Ins.] 
Co., 374 F.Supp. 564 (E.D.Pa.1974), supp. op. (E.D.Pa.) 
384 F.Supp. 302. 
118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct.App.1990) (emphasis in 
the original). See also Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 
20, 23 (1st Cir.1990) (comparing a 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 
motion the Court and finding, "[0 ]ne fundamental difference 
between the two motions lies in the scope of the court's 
consideration. The grounds for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal comprise 
only the pleadings and no more ") (emphasis added). 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833,243 P.3d 642,649 (2010). 
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Judge Elgee recognized this general rule of law but then proceeded to consider facts 
outside the pleadings. "While no specific authority has been found on this point, the Court is 
assuming, without deciding, that it may look to facts not contained or alleged in the pleadings 
when examining the issue of ripeness." R., p. 106. The Court observed that ABC's claim of 
hardship arose outside the pleadings. Id. district court could have, and should have, 
ABC's conten1tlon and arguments 
CAG Reply because IS now to make ''''''..",,'~ representations 
and warranties to prospective buyers is conspicuously absent from the Complaint. As a result, 
those matters cannot be considered in determining whether ABC's claim is ripe. 
ABC's attempt to fashion ripeness out of the arguments in the CAG Reply Brief is 
particularly inappropriate as it not only pertains to matters outside ofthe Complaint but it also 
ignores the context in which CAG raised potential defenses to ABC's position on the merits. 
CAG raised the doctrine of merger as one potential defense to ABC's declaratory judgment 
action only to demonstrate the waste of time and money that would occur if the parties were 
forced to litigate the matter. CAG stated: "The point here is not to argue the merits ofthe 
merger question, but to point out that litigating complicated legal matters that may never need to 
be addressed is a waste oftime, money, and judicial resources." R., p. 77. CAG specifically 
noted that its discussion of merger was "[f]or example, but not by way oflimitation .... " Not 
only is CAG's reference to merger as a potential defense outside ofthe allegations in the 
Complaint, but it was only brought up in the first place to emphasize the potential consequence 
to the parties oflitigating issues based on hypothetical facts. A lawyer's statement in a 
memorandum discussing potential legal issues hardly seems like the basis for a finding of 
npeness. 
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In any event, neither CAG's reference to the doctrine of merger nor ABC's unsupported 
statements regarding its inability to make warranties and representations concerning the Property 
serve to make ABC's claim ripe, even if such matters could properly be considered. As the 
district court observed, if a party to a contract were allowed to file a declaratory judgment action 
anytime it wished to flush out or test the other party's defenses, "then all contracts are subject to 
judgment actions at all times." 105. court 
significant to the extent ABC has been an 111"1"PIT'>1 legal position 
or the arguments made in this action, ABC put itself there. 
However, it cannot be overstated that CAG did not, as asserted by 
ABC, raise claims or defenses in pursuit of a plan or scheme to put 
ABC in some difficult legal position, in order to lower the value of 
the property or affect its marketability, or even enhance its legal 
position vis a vis ABC Rather, CA G only responded to ABC's 
initial inquiry or request for contract assurances by stating that its 
awareness of ABC's previous position "should not be interpreted 
as a statement that CAG agrees with such positions. /I Period. If 
ABC was concerned with being able to make representations as a 
seller, it could have left matters there. Instead, ABC filed suit 
requesting a declaratory judgment: when pressed for a legal 
position as to why litigation was not a good idea, CAG responded. 
It does not escape the Court that if ABC has been placed in an 
untenable legal position regarding its ability to give assurances to a 
future potential buyer, it put itself there. There is an old equitable 
maxim that a party should not be able to gain out of its own wrong. 
While neither party here has anything to "gain" if the Motion to 
Dismiss is denied except the possibility of expensive litigation, 
[ABC2] stands to gain by its actions ifit is able to make a case ripe 
for judicial determination by pressing for a legal resolution of a 
matter which the other side not only did not seek, but has 




2 The Memorandum Decision says "CAG" here but it appears to be a typographical error based 




R., p. 108 (emphasis in original).3 As the final nail, the district court accurately stated: "Even if 
hardship exists to some degree to ABC, it does not outweigh the relative merits of the ripeness 
doctrine." R., p. 109.4 Part of the "relative merits" is not forcing the parties into litigation, 
which necessarily consumes both judicial resources and private resources, when there is no real 
immediate need for it. That is the case here. 
CAG IS ENTITLED TO ATTORt~EY FEES; ABC IS NOT, 
court to prevailing party and awarded costs attorney 
fees pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Option Agreement, Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), and 
LR.C.P. Rule 54. The only basis upon which ABC appeals the award of costs and fees is based 
upon the outcome of the ripeness question. Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25. As discussed above, 
the district court properly found that ABC's claim against CAG was not ripe. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the district court's decision, which means that CAG remains the prevailing 
party below and confirms its right to recover its costs and fees as reflected in the Amended 
Judgment. 
The same reasoning applies on appeal. The parties appear to agree that the prevailing 
party on appeal in this matter is entitled to an award of its costs and attorney fees incurred on 
3 Judge Elgee stated that his use of the maxim that no party should be able to gain from its own 
wrong was not intended to imply that ABC committed any wrongful act but instead was in recognition of 
the fact that ABC started the "snowball effect" by writing to CAG. R., p. 108-09, fn 2. "CAG was a 
sleeping dog. It only raised the possibility of a defense after i\BC's counsel sought acquiescence or 
acknowledgements CAG was unwilling to give, and was not required to give." R., p. 105. 
4 While CAG believes that such matters should not be considered at all, CAG feels compelled to 
observe that ABC's claim that it has been harmed by any uncertainty created by CAG is a red herring. 
ABC's contention that CAG's statements trigger any duty on the part of ABC to disclose such issues to a 
prospective buyer is patently wrong. Even if we assume (without any factual basis or allegation) that a 
prospective buyer would demand warranties such as those contained in the Option Agreement, none of 
CAG's statements constitutes a basis for a "claim, action, suit, arbitration, proceeding or investigation." 
The Option Agreement and Supplemental Declaration are matters of public record that would be 
identified on a title report. Any prospective purchaser can read those documents and evaluate the legal 




appeal pursuant to I.A.R. Rules 40 and 41, Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and paragraph 11 of 
the Option Agreement. Thus, assuming this Court agrees with the decision of the trial court, 
CAG should be awarded its costs and fees on appeal and ABC's request for costs and fees on 
appeal should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Parties are not to litigate, and courts are not to decide, issues as to 
is no current need adjudication for which there may never be such a 
record this case, which consists only of the factual allegations in the Complaint, reflects that 
there is no need at this time for any sort of decision regarding the applicability, enforceability, or 
interpretation of the use restriction the Option Agreement. If the owner of the property does 
not pursue a use that implicates the covenant, then any litigation regarding that covenant will 
have been a waste of time, money, and judicial resources. The Complaint contains no allegations 
whatsoever concerning any proposed use of the property. As a result, there is no real and 
immediate controversy that requires adjudication at this time. ABC's claim against CAG is not 
npe. 
For all the reasons set forth above, CAG respectfully submits that this Court should 
affirm the district court's dismissal of ABC's Complaint and the award of costs and fees below, 
award CAG its costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal, and deny ABC's request for costs and 
fees on appeal. 
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